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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARIE CHILD HAMILTON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.

vs.

GORDON DEAN HAMILTON,
Defendant and Appellant.

12543

REPLY BRIEF
REPLY ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY VALUED THE DEFENDANT'S PARTNERSHIP
INTEREST.
The trial court awarded plaintiff all of the parties'
joint assets plus a judgment of $27 ,000. The decree provides that the judgment is a lien upon the defendant's
partnership interest in Hamilton Brothers Electrical Contractors until satisfied, with interest.
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At the time of the hearing the only business accounting records available to defendant were for the first 11
months of 1970. This incomplete balance sheet, offered
as plaintiff's Exhibit 2, indicated defendant's partnership
interest to have a book value of $110,988.15.
The twelve-month financial statement was available only after judgment was entered. It showed the actual book value of defendant's partnership interest to be
$89,299.42 or more than $20,000 less than the November 30, 1970 accounting (R. 44, 45).
Such a significant change in the book value of the
defendant's interest required that the trial court in the
interest of justice reconsider the money judgment awards.
Whatever legal principles or arithmetic the court
used in making the award of money and property, a substantial change in the facts from those believed to exist
at the time of trial compels some downward adjustment
and not simply an additional amount of time to satisfy
that which is unreasonable, which was the action taken
by the trial court in ruling upon defendant's motion for
new trial.
Plaintiff's brief argues that because defendant supplied the 11-month accounting he is denied the right to
challenge the reasonableness of the judgment against him.
This information, however, was supplied defendant
by his accountant. What could the defendant do but
make it available to the court? Should the defendant
be penalized for having made a full disclosure?
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No good is served by affirming a judgment which
is based on an error as material as this.
Even if this court were to decide that defendant is
now precluded from offering a full year balance sheet
on his business in lieu of the incomplete 11-month statement used at trial, the judgment below is still erroneous.
The error lies in the court's failure to recognize that
the book value of the business, like any service-providing
industry, has no real market value, except possibly to a
co-partner.
Indeed, lending institutions recogmze that a partnership interest in a service business is worthless as security for a loan. The income of such a business is derived not from the tools and equipment but from the
skills of the partners.
The affidavit of Wallace H. Gardner (R. 42), a
banking, loan and credit analyst having over 30 years'
experience makes it clear that the defendant cannot get
a $27 ,000 loan using his partnership interest as security:
"I am personally acquainted with the financial status of Hamilton Brothers Electrical Contractors, that I, from time to time, have made
loans to that partnership and I am personally acquainted with both partners. Notwithstanding the
fact that Gordon Dean Hamilton is a person of
good reputation and with good credit, it is my opinion that no banking institution would lend him
$27 ,000.00 based upon his partnership equity as
security. The partnership equity is not a satisfactory security for a banking institution and would
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not, in my opinion, meet the standards required of
banks or the Commissioner of Financial Institutions and would, the refore, not qualify for a loan.

" ... I know of no other security that he has
that would support a loan by any institution that
utilizes ordinary financial criteria as the basis for
making loans." (R. 42, 43). (italics added).
Because the court cannot impose another partner
upon the business in place of defendant, or force the
partnership out of business, the only value the court
should have considered was the price defendant's copartner would pay for defendant's interest.
The co-partner has offered this evidence in his sworn
affidavit:
"It is my opm10n that fair market value of
all the assets of Hamilton Brothers Electrical Contractors would not exceed $160,663.79, and on
that basis, the net capital account of my brother
and partner, Gordon D. Hamilton, would not exceed $80,331.89.

"I further state that if I had to purchase the
interest of my partner, because of the other factors
involved, not the least of which is having a partner to help carry management duties and business
risks, I would not pay more than $55,000.00 for
such interest, and that sum would have to be
amortized in quarterly payments over five years
with interest of probably 71/2%." (R. 53). (italics
added).

The real value of anything is only that amount of
money another will pay. In this case the trial court ignored this common sense truth and calculated the judgment using a partnership value over twice the actual
value.
An error of such dimensions cannot be left undisturbed. This case should be remanded to properly determine the money judgment portion of this case.
POINT II
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO SATISFY.
Whatever value is assumed for the business, however, the practical problem is simply: "Is it possible for
the defendant to satisfy the $27,000 judgment, make the
required alimony and support payments and still provide for his own needs?
As Mrs. Hamilton was awarded everything the nyo
possessed except the partnership interest, every dollar
which defendant is required to pay must have its source
in the partnership. Prior discussion in Point I has shown
a loan is not possible.
In deciding the amount of alimony and child support the lower court appears to have focused upon the
defendant's income over the two highest of the last four
years. This was error where the payments are projected
over a number of years and possibly the rest of defendant's life.
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It is common knowledge that the income of a contractor fluctuates from year to year. It may be that several projects are completed in one year providing a good
income while the following year with many projects rn
various stages of construction the partner's income is
considerably less than the prior year.
Therefore, while it might be possible for the defendant to make ordered payments during a successful
year, a slow income year would make it impossible for
him to support himself and make the other payments
ordered by the court.
The average income of defendant over the last four
years, based upon the figures in Exhibit 3 is $12,714.94.
However, the 1970 income figure was subject to
adjustment when the final year end accounting was completed. Substituting the proper 1970 income figure as
verified by defendant's 1970 federal income tax return,
the four-year average income is $10,908.94.
This is an average monthly income of either
$1,059.58 or $909.09.
Ignoring for the moment the fact that defendant
somehow must come up with $27 ,000, subtracting his
present monthly obligations under the judgment of
$650.00 from his monthly average income leaves him
either $259.09 or $409.58 per month to live on.
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Respondent on page I 0 of her brief refers to the
amount of $1,007.17 as the sum which is "reasonably required . . . per month to make ends meet.
" simply
for the expenses of "bare necessities."
Then on page 11 of her brief reference is made to
Appellant's claim of $440 he needs per month to support himself as "his very huge estimated needs . . . . "

If plaintiff's $1,007.17 per month will only provide
"bare necessities," then her own brief is evidence she
expects the defendants to live without even "bare necessities"!
Indeed, the $289.09 to $409.58 left defendant to live
on is a gross amount which, when reduced by taxes alone,
leaves the defendant much less to live on than the $440
per month plaintiff argues are "huge estimated needs"!
As if this were not enough, plaintiff appears to contend that interest is accruing on the $27 ,000 notwithstanding the defendant's obligation to pay an additional
$100 per month until the $27 ,000 is paid.
Interest at the legal rate is provided for in the Decree in paragraph 6 (R. 3 3). Reduction of the alimony
by $100 per month after paying the $27,000 is provided
in paragraph 8 of the Decree (R. 34).

If the Decree is to be read literally, then defendant's real monthly obligations, after considering accumulated interest must be increased by a further sum of
$160.01 (at 8% per annum), or to a total of $810.01 to
be paid from an average monthly income from $909.09!
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Such a result could not have been intended by the
trial court. Defendant denies the Decree should be so
read. Plaintiff, however, contends otherwise:
"Appellant can avoid the interest and save $1,200.00 per year alimony by satisfying the judgment." Respondent's Brief at 10. (italics added).
Even if the interest question not be as plaintiff contends, however, the judgment has still made it impossible for the defendant to support himself.
Surely it cannot be said that the trial court's judgment follows the command of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5
(1953) that the court's order,
"in relation to the children, property and parties,
and the maintenance of the parties and children
... be equitable."

If equitable can be defined in any one way upon
which reasonable people will agree, it is that:
"A court cannot make an award which will impoverish the husband." Santilli v. Santilli, 453
P.2d 606, 609 (Colo. 1969).
The practical effect of the trial court's order will
financially impoverish the defendant. Such a condition
cannot be left unaltered.
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CONCLUSION
The policy of the law in divorce cases is to order
payments which are equitable and are believed to be
equitable by the parties involved.
It has never been the policy of the law to destroy
a man's ability to support his family or, through an impossible judgment, to destroy his incentive to provide
for his family.
The trial court's judgment does both. It should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
Harold G. Christensen of
WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN
Attorney for Appellant
7th Floor, Continental Bk. Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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